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Note
Awakening a Sleeping Dog: An Examination
of the Confusion in Ascertaining Purposeful
Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce
Julian Cyril Zebot*
"Let sleeping dogs lie."
-Proverb
"Even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being
kicked."
2
-Oliver Wendell Holmes

As a legal doctrine, the dormant Commerce Clause has often proven to be a difficult specimen. In applying the doctrine,
the Supreme Court has labeled it a "quagmire,"3 "not predictable,"4 "hopelessly confused," 5 and "not always ...easy to follow." 6 Yet the Court is responsible for the esoteric nature of the
"dormant" or "negative" Commerce Clause, as the Court has
denied it the time and attention routinely given to other constitutional provisions. 7 While this appears to be changing, 8 the
* J.D. Candidate 2003, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2000,
Grinnell College. The Author would like to thank Mehmet Konar-Steenberg
for suggesting the topic of this Note, and Alexis Pfeiffer, Christy Szitta, Kathryn Olson, and Frank Piskolich for their editorial assistance.
1. BREWER'S DIcTIONARY OF PRASE & FABLE 690 (16th ed. 1999).
2. OLIVER W. HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 3 (Dover Publications
1991) (1881).
3. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
458 (1959).
4. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897-98
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
5. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 706 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
6. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987).
7. As one commentator has noted, the categorical treatment of cases under the doctrine seemingly stifled its development. See Michael E. Smith,
State DiscriminationsAgainst Interstate Commerce, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1203,
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dormant Commerce Clause remains the least glamorous of the
commonly litigated constitutional provisions. The source of its
unwelcome status is debatable.9 Regardless of its origins, the
confusion surrounding the dormant Commerce Clause has had
the deleterious effect of discouraging close public and judicial
scrutiny of the doctrine. 10
This collective failure to take notice has served to compound the doctrinal awkwardness of which many complain.
Perhaps uniquely, the lack of attention has contributed to the
dormant Commerce Clause's development independent of other
constitutional provisions." Nowhere is this more evident than
in the discussion surrounding whether a particular state's
statutory provision discriminates in its purpose against interstate commerce.
Unlike discriminatory purpose analysis
within the realm of individual rights, the courts applying the
dormant Commerce Clause have taken various unprincipled
1203 (1986). As a result, between 1941 and 1976, approximately ten cases
were found to involve violations of the dormant Commerce Clause. Id.
8. Between 1976 and 1986, the dormant Commerce Clause was found to
have been violated in at least ten cases. Id. In the words of another commentator, "the mid-1970s brought a resurgence of invalidations under the clause."
John J. Dinan, The Rehnquist Court's FederalismDecisions in Perspective, 15
J.L. & POL. 127, 182 (1999).
9. There are a few obvious explanations for this. First, as mentioned supra,this is quite possibly the result of the staid nature of the doctrine prior to
the 1970s. See Smith, supra note 7, at 1203. Second, as several commentators
have suggested, the Court's scattered approach may serve the purpose of
maintaining judicial discretion "to prevent what appear to be instances of intolerable local or state interference with interstate markets." Michael A. Lawrence, Toward a More Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause:A Proposed Unitary Framework, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 395, 397-98 (1998) (quoting
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 440 (2d ed. 1988)). Finally, as some have suggested, the courts could just be unsure as to whether
the negative aspect of the Clause should be judicially enforced, or left to Congress. DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE
CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY 863-64 (2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONAL LAWI.

10. In addition, the seemingly insignificant subject matter of the statutes
struck down enables the doctrine to keep a low public profile. See Daniel A.
Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 3 CONST.
COMMENT. 395, 413 (1986).
11. One commentator has noted that the dormant Commerce Clause has
developed differently from the Equal Protection Clause, even though "the
dormant commerce clause serves a function much like that of the equal protection clause." Id. at 403. While "[a] business can establish a prima facie claim
under the commerce clause by showing either discriminatory intent, a disparate impact, or a substantial burden.., a disparate impact on the minority is
not enough" to state such a case under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at
403-04.
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approaches to determining whether a statute is the product of a
discriminatory purpose. 12
This is not an idle concern, especially within the context of
waste management. As policies designed to encourage recycling
and landfill conservation have been implemented in response to
our nation's growing waste crisis, 13 waste haulers, landfill owners, and other parties with an economic interest in the prosperity of landfilling have sought, often successfully, to invalidate
such regulation under the dormant Commerce Clause. 14 While
plaintiffs challenging local waste management policies and decisionimaking under the dormant Commerce Clause often assert
a variety of theories of liability, 15 they regularly allege purposive discrimination because of the contentious nature of po12. Compare, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274, 285-86 (1977) (considering whether improper motive was a "but for"
cause of the discriminatory action), with McNeilus Truck & Mfg., Inc. v. Ohio,
226 F.3d 429, 443-44 (6th Cir. 2000) (failing to consider whether improper motive was a "but for" cause of the discriminatory statute).
13. As of 1997, the United States was producing 200 million tons of
household waste per year, an amount that was expected to grow to about 216
million tons by 2000. James E. Breitenbucher, Note, Yakety Yak, Take Your
Garbage Back: Do States Have Any ProtectionFrom Becoming The Dumping
Grounds For Out-of-State Municipal Solid Waste?, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 225, 225 (1997). In addition, the nation also produces an astonishing 275 million tons of hazardous waste per year. Erin A. Walter, Note,
The Supreme Court Goes Dormant When Desperate Times Call for Desperate
Measures:Looking to the European Union for a Lesson in EnvironmentalProtection, 65 FORDHAM1 L. REV. 1161, 1161 (1996). In response to such dire
numbers, and the real environmental problems, such as groundwater contamination, that accompany them, many communities and states have
adopted ordinances designed to increase the costs of landfilling and encourage
local recycling. See Breitenbucher, supra, at 227-28.
14. See Breitenbucher, supra note 13 at 228. ("The waste management
associations have been largely successful in challenging recycling laws ...by
arguing that the laws violate the dormant Commerce Clause."); see also Walter, supra note 13, at 1164 ("These constitutionally mandated principles of free
trade and market unity have been a silent but deadly foe for state environmental protection measures.") (citation omitted).
15. See, e.g., Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 334
(4th Cir. 2001) (stating that the plaintiffs argued that the statute discriminated against interstate commerce in both purpose and effect); E. Ky. Res. v.
Fiscal Ct. of Magoffin County, 127 F.3d 532, 540 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that
plaintiff argued that the challenged statute was facially, purposefully, and effectually discriminatory); SDDS, Inc. v. South Dakota, 47 F.3d 263, 268 (8th
Cir. 1995) (examining theories of both discriminatory purpose and effect);
Randy's Sanitation, Inc. v. Wright County, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1021, 1029 (D.
Minn. 1999) (explaining that the plaintiff argued that the challenged statute
was both facially discriminatory and excessively burdensome and that challenged permit decision was both purposefully and effectually discriminatory).
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litical debate on waste issues. 16 Where a particular policy or
decision is unobjectionable under the other theories, 17 the
method by which the courts determine the presence of discriminatory purpose decides the balance to be struck between
federal and state power on such issues.18 To the extent that the
courts' indiscriminate approach in finding discriminatory purpose increases the potential for unwarranted and unpredictable
judicial interference, it chills state and local creativity in crafting environmentally friendly waste management policies and
undermines the dormant Commerce Clause as a doctrine. 19
In light of these concerns, this Note argues that the current approach to analyzing discriminatory purpose in a state
action is dysfunctional. Case law reveals the possibility for the
doctrine's abuse and provides ample opportunity for its indictment. Part I uses the Court's decision in Mt. Healthy to describe the approach used to establish discriminatory purpose
dominant in other constitutional settings. Part II provides a
brief overview of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence and
how it has addressed the issue of ascertaining discriminatory
purpose. Part III outlines the problems of the courts' current
approach. Part IV evaluates Mt. Healthy as a possible alternative approach, analyzing its implications for both waste management policy and the dormant Commerce Clause as a whole.
This Note concludes that application of the Mt. Healthy standard to analysis under the dormant Commerce Clause would
produce consistent, coherent judicial decisions that would uphold a tenable balance between local waste management policymaking and federal supremacy in regulating interstate commerce.

16. Given the wide range of views on waste management matters, there
are almost always some policymakers who advocate a "not in my backyard"
("NIMBY") position, tainting the political process and making a discriminatory
purpose argument possible for aggrieved parties. See, e.g., Waste Mgmt., 252
F.3d at 336-37 (providing examples of remarks made by the governor and legislative sponsor evincing discriminatory intent); SDDS, 47 F.3d at 268 (finding
statements made in an election pamphlet to provide "ample evidence of a discriminatory purpose").
17. One can easily imagine a waste management policy that would result
in neither a discriminatory effect nor an excessive burden on interstate commerce. See infra text accompanying notes 140-41

18. In such a context, the courts' decision on discriminatory purpose is determinative of the boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate policymaking. See infra notes 163-67and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 163-67and accompanying text.
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I. MT. HEALTHY: THE DOMINANT APPROACH TO
ASCERTAINING DISCRIMINATORY PURPOSE
The standard method of ascertaining discriminatory purpose in constitutional contexts other than the dormant Commerce Clause is found in the Supreme Court's decisions in Mt.
Healthy City School
DistrictBoard of Education v. Doyle20 and
21
Lesage.
Texas v.
Decided by the Court on the same day as Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,22 Mt.
Healthy's new, and at the time controversial, approach to determining whether an action was unconstitutional by reason of
discriminatory intent arose in the context of an alleged First
Amendment violation.0 The plaintiff, a teacher, sued the board
of education for failing to give him tenure, claiming that this
decision was in response to his public disclosure of an internal
memorandum concerning the school's uniform policy.24 To support his claim, the plaintiff introduced a letter he received from
the board that indicated that its decision not to offer tenure
25
was, in part, made on the basis of the disclosure incident.
The letter, however, also noted that the plaintiff had engaged
in other questionable, if not inappropriate, actions, including
using "obscene gestures to correct students."26 The board also
produced evidence that the plaintiff had been previously disciplined for an altercation involving another teacher. 27
On the basis of this record, the district court held that the
plaintiffs tenure was denied in retaliation for exercising his
right to free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 28 In so holding, the district court made two essential
findings. First, it found that the plaintiffs conduct in publicizing the internal memo was expressive and therefore constitutionally protected. 29 Second, it determined that the plaintiffs

20. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
21. 528 U.S. 18 (1999) (per curiam).
22. 429 U.S. 252, 270 (1977) (holding that plaintiffs in equal protection
cases must make an initial showing that discriminatory purpose was a "motivating factor" in the state actor's decision).
23. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 276.
24. See id. at 281-83.
25. Id. at 282-83.
26. Id. at 283 n.1.
27. Id. at 281.
28. Id. at 276.
29. Id. at 283.

1068

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.86:1063

constitutionally protected speech played a "substantial part" in
the board's decision not to tenure plaintiff3 0 Consequently, the
district court concluded, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed,
that
31
the plaintiff was entitled to reinstatement with back pay.
In a decision with momentous consequences, the Supreme
Court vacated the decision and remanded, finding that the district court and the Sixth Circuit had been incautious in determining whether the board had actually retaliated against
the
plaintiff in violation of his First Amendment rights. 32 The
problem with the lower court's analysis was that "it would require reinstatement in cases where a dramatic and abrasive incident is inevitably on the minds of those responsible for the
decision to rehire, and does indeed play a part in that decision
even if the same decision would have been reached had the incident not occurred." 33 The district court's "substantial part"
rule, by itself, would produce the absurd result of "plac[ing] an
employee in a better position as a result of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than he would have occupied
had he done nothing."34 The Court found this to be "commanding undesirable consequences not necessary to the assurance of
35
those [constitutional] rights."
To correct this result, the Court found that the lower courts
should have gone beyond their finding-that the constitutionally protected conduct was a "substantial fact or part" in the
decision not to rehire-to determine whether that conduct was
also the cause-in-fact of the tenure decision. 36 The Court placed
the burden of this additional showing on the defendant, essentially requiring the board of education to disprove that it acted

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 285-86. To prove a First Amendment retaliation claim, a
plaintiff must prove that the adverse action taken was the result of an improper motive to retaliate against the exercise of constitutionally protected
speech. See id.
33. See id. at 285.

34. Id.
35. Id. at 287. The "substantial part" rule is not necessary to the assurance of First Amendment rights because those rights are only violated when
retaliatory motive is the real, "but for" cause of the adverse action. See id.
But see Sheldon Nahmod, Mt. Healthy and Causation-in-Fact:The Court Still
Doesn't Get It!, 51 MERCER L. REV. 603, 605 (2000) (arguing that there has
been a constitutional violation in such cases despite the Court's approach in
Mt. Healthy).

36. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.
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out of discriminatory animus. 37 As a result, the Court remanded the case to the lower courts to determine whether the
defendant had carried its burden by proving that it would have
reached the same decision even in the absence of the protected
38
conduct.
While subsequent Supreme Court decisions have applied
the standard implemented in Mt. Healthy,39 no recent decision
has gone further in extending it than Texas v. Lesage.40 In that
case the plaintiff, a rejected candidate for a state university
doctoral program, sued the state alleging violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.41 The plaintiff based his claim on the university's use of racial criteria in
the admissions process, contending that he had been discriminated against as a white applicant. 42 In rebuttal, the university argued that the plaintiff had been rejected not because he
was white, but because his credentials were inferior compared
43
to those of the other candidates admitted into the program.
In reversing the court of appeals' denial of summary judgment to the university, the Supreme Court took issue with the
Fifth Circuit's analysis of what constitutes a redressable injury
under § 1983." Specifically, it rejected the Fifth Circuit's refusal to consider whether the university would have admitted
the plaintiff under a race-neutral admissions policy as inconsistent with Mt. Healthy.45 As the Court stated, "The underlying
principle is the same: The government can avoid liability by
proving that it would have made the same decision without the
impermissible motive."46 The Court also rejected the sugges37. See id.
38. Id. On remand, the district court found that the defendant had met
its burden by showing that it would have terminated the plaintiff regardless of
his protected conduct. See Doyle v. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.,
670 F.2d 59, 61 (6th Cir. 1982).
39. See, e.g., Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 593 (1998) (applying
Mt. Healthy in a First Amendment retaliation case); Bd. of County Comm'rs,
Wabaunsee County v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675 (1996) (same).
40. 528 U.S. 18 (1999) (per curiam).
41. Id. at 19.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 19-20 (stating that "students ultimately admitted to the
program ha[d] credentials that the committee considered superior to Plaintiffs") (citation omitted).
44. See id. at 20.
45. Id. (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd.of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274,287 (1977)).
46. Id. at 21.
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tion that the Mt. Healthy standard was limited solely to the
context of First Amendment retaliation cases: "Our previous
decisions on this point have typically involved alleged retaliation for protected First Amendment activity rather than racial
discrimination, but that distinction is immaterial."47 Accordingly, the Court held that the Fifth Circuit should have determined whether the university could have conclusively established that it would not have admitted the plaintiff under a
race-neutral policy.48 If, on remand, the court found that such
was the case, the Supreme Court held that summary judgment
should be granted for the university on the plaintiffs § 1983
49
claim.
Mt. Healthy and Lesage both stand for the principle that
where an improper motive must be proved, and several different motives are present, the improper motive must be found to
be the "but for" cause of the adverse action taken. 50 In different
terms, such a causal test allows courts to distinguish, like
Holmes's dog, between cases in which the plaintiffs class has
been "stumbled over" by the state actor and cases in which the
state actor has "kicked" it.51 Without the Mt. Healthy test, the
courts are blind to whether an adverse action was actually
52
caused by an improper motive.
The courts' widespread application of Mt. Healthy and
Lesage is supportive of the test's efficacy. Having applied the
Mt. Healthy approach in the context of First Amendment,
Equal Protection, and § 1983 claims, 53 the Supreme Court has
shown a willingness to treat cases involving an allegation of in-

47. Id.
48. Id. at 22.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 21 (finding no "cognizable injury" when an adverse governmental decision would have been made regardless of the presence of an improper motive); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274, 287 (1977) (establishing a burden-shifting standard, where defendant has
the burden of showing the action taken would have been made even in the absence of the protected conduct).
51. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
52. Cf Catherine G. O'Grady, Targeting State Protectionism Instead of
Interstate Discrimination Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 34 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 571, 599 (1997) ("[Sltate legislation will be 'protectionist' under
the definition of protectionism offered here if the record indicates that it was
substantially motivated by the need to protect resident economic interests ....").
53. See Lesage, 528 U.S. at 19; Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.
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tentional discrimination to the same searching analysis.5 4 After all, as the Court suggested in Lesage, the distinction between such cases is "immaterial." 55 As Part II will note, however, in spite of Mt. Healthy's successful application in other
constitutional settings, the courts have never given serious
consideration to using it as part of the discriminatory
purpose
56
analysis under the dormant Commerce Clause.
II. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE: HISTORY AND
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. FRAMERS' INTENT AND JUDICIAL UNDERSTANDING

"The Congress shall have the power... [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
57
States, and with the Indian Tribes ....
While the Commerce Clause clearly grants the federal
government, specifically Congress, the power to regulate interstate commerce,58 the converse proposition, that the states have
no or limited authority to do so, has always been somewhat
more controversial. 59 Lacking a firm textual foundation, the
current understanding of the Clause is 60
rooted within the intent
of the Framers as divined by the courts.
While this understanding is often debated among scholars,6 1 it does derive some support from the writings of the
54. Cf Lesage, 528 U.S. at 21 (finding the distinction between First
Amendment and Equal Protection cases to be "immaterial).
55. Id.
56. No court has explicitly considered the possibility ofn"mixed motives" in
deciding a case. See infra note 117 and accompanying text. But see Randy's
Sanitation, Inc. v. Wright County, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1029 (D. Minn. 1999)
(stating that in order to prevail on summary judgment the plaintiff must prove
that the county would not have made the same decision in the absence of a
discriminatory motive).
57.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

58. Id.
59. See Dinan, supra note 8, at 181-83 (discussing the federalism critique
of the dormant Commerce Clause); infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
60. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979) (stating that
the courts have interpreted the Commerce Clause in line with the Framers'
"central concern" of economic balkanization among the states).
61. See, e.g., Richard B. Collins, Justice Scalia and the Elusive Idea of
DiscriminationAgainst Interstate Commerce, 20 N.M. L. REV. 555, 557 (1990)
(adopting Justice Scalia's argument against the dormant Commerce Clause for
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Framers themselves. In an 1829 letter to a friend, James
Madison wrote that the Commerce Clause was "intended as a
negative and preventive provision against injustice among the
States themselves, rather than as a power to be used for the
positive purposes of the General Government, in which alone,
however, the remedial power could be lodged."62 Certainly,
given the spectacular failure of the Articles of Confederation to
prevent economic trade wars and retaliation among the
states, 63 there is strong evidence to indicate that the Framers
intended such a provision be read into the Commerce Clause.64
This scholarly debate is moot for all practical purposes,
however. Regardless of whether the Framers themselves intended a dormant Commerce Clause, the courts charged with
interpreting the Constitution have found one implied within

lack of textual support); Julian N. Eule, Laying the DormantCommerce Clause
to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 428 (1982) (suggesting that the Privileges and Immunities Clause is the better clause to protect out-of-state economic interests);
Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The DormantCommerce Clause and the
ConstitutionalBalance of Federalism,1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 571 ("[T]he simple
fact is that there is no dormant commerce clause to be found within the text or
textual structure of the Constitution.").
62. Lincoln L. Davies, Note, If You Give the Courta Commerce Clause:An
Environmental Justice Critique of Supreme Court Interstate Waste Jurisprudence, 11 FoRDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 207, 246-47 (1999) (quoting Letter from
James Madison to Joseph C. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), in 4 LErERS AND OTHER
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 14, 15 (1867)); see also W. Lynn Creamery, Inc.
v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 n.9 (1994) (discussing Madison's quote). Davies,
however, notes that this statement has not been without controversy, as
Madison's use of the term "General Government" has been debated. See Davies, supra, at 247. If "General Government" is taken to mean the judiciary,
the statement would seem to provide an historical foundation for the dormant
Commerce Clause. See id. If, however, the term was simply used in reference
to the legislature, no such support for the dormant Commerce Clause can be
derived. See id. As a result, both supporters and detractors of the Clause
have used Madison's statement to support their contentions. See id. One
commentator has noted that Madison, more so than any other Framer, was
concerned with state regulation of both foreign and interstate commerce.
Smith, supra note 7, at 1207.
63. Under the Articles of Confederation, states discriminated against interstate commerce as a matter of course, inhibiting national economic development. See CHARLES W. MEISTER, THE FOUNDING FATHERS 7-8 (1987). The
most common form of such discrimination was the taxation of goods passing
through a state in interstate commerce. See id.
64. Indeed, in Hughes, Justice Brennan wrote, 'The few simple words of
the Commerce Clause... reflected.., the [Framers'] conviction that in order
to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later
among the States under the Articles of Confederation." 441 U.S. at 325-26.
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the Clause.65 In Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., Justice Cardozo, reiterating Judge Hand before him, stated, 'Ve are reminded.., that a chief occasion of the commerce clauses was
'the mutual jealousies and aggressions of the States, taking
form in customs barriers and other economic retaliation.' 66 In
perhaps the most eloquent restatement of the judicial understanding of the Framers' intent, Justice Jackson wrote in H.P.
Hood & Sons v. Du Mond,
When victory relieved the Colonies from the pressure for solidarity
that war had exerted, a drift toward anarchy and commercial warfare
between states began. "... each State would legislate according to its
estimate of its own interests, the importance of its own products, and
the local advantages or disadvantages of its position in a political or
commercial view." 67
This came "to threaten at once the peace and
safety of the Union."

Consequently, courts have seen it as their duty under the
Commerce Clause to advance the "solidarity and prosperity of
this Nation" by checking
local regulations that interfere with
68
interstate commerce.

B. DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT
Although there is widespread agreement among the courts
that a dormant Commerce Clause exists, there has been a startling lack of consensus as to how to implement this judicial understanding of the Framers' intent. 69 In part, this is because
judicial understanding has shifted over time and with the de70
velopment of the national economy.

65. This is not to suggest that there is no dissension within the ranks of
the Judiciary. Certainly, many judges have applied the same types of critiques made by scholarly detractors of the dormant Commerce Clause. See
Dinan, supra note 8, at 181-85 (discussing the Supreme Court's recent concern
with the dormant Commerce Clause's origins); infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
66. 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935) (quoting Seelig v. Baldwin, 7 F. Supp. 776
(S.D.N.Y. 1934) (citing 2 MAX FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION 308; 3 id. at, 478, 547-48; THE FEDERALIST No. 42; 1 GEORGE
CURTIS, HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 502; JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES

ON THE CONSTITUTION § 259)).
67. 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949) (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMIENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 259-60 (1833)).
68. See, e.g., id. at 535.
69. See Lawrence, supra note 9, at 397 ("It seems that the only thing consistently predictable about the [Court's interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause] is its continued unpredictability." (quoting Eule, supra note 61,
at 479)).
70. See id. at 409-10 (contending that the demise of the "local-national"
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Initially, the Supreme Court, in Gibbons v. Ogden,71 suggested that the Commerce Clause be interpreted as "a grant of
the whole" power to Congress to regulate interstate commerce,
"leav[ing] no residuum" to the states.7 2 This "dual federalism"
vision of the balance between federal and state power in regulating commerce, however, eroded in the face of the realization
that the domain of purely intrastate commerce was rapidly
dwindling, and, thus, the
delicate balance of state and federal
73
power was being upset.
As courts began to accept the fact that the states had some
authority to regulate interstate commerce, a new dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine emerged. Instead of prohibiting all
state regulation, the courts held that the Clause proscribes only
against, or excesexercises of state power that discriminate
74
sively burden, interstate commerce.
Nonetheless, for most of the past century courts confused

subject distinction within dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence was due
to the growing difficulty of distinguishing between local and national economic
interests).
71. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
72. Id. at 198; see also Justin Shoemake, Note, The Smalling of America?:
Growth Management Statutes and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 48 DUKE
L.J. 891, 911 (1999) (reading Gibbons to suggest "a complete prohibition on
state regulation of interstate commerce"). Although Gibbons was the first case
to involve discussion of the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause, it did not
actually decide the issue of whether the Clause prohibited state regulation of
commerce because the statute at issue was preempted by federal law. See
Lawrence, supra note 9, at 408-09.
73. See Shoemake, supra note 72, at 911 ("The Court ...soon recognized
that denting the states any power to legislate in the area [of interstate commerce] could upset the delicate balance between the states and the national
government,"). Under the "dual federalism" view of the Constitution, a power
provided to the federal government was not thought to be available to the
states, and vice versa. Davies, supra note 62, at 251-52.
74. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)
(citing to numerous cases standing for the same proposition); see also Shoemake, supra note 72, at 911. It should also be noted that the prohibitions imposed by this conceptualization of the dormant Commerce Clause are not final.
If Congress wishes, it may grant a state permission to discriminate against
interstate commerce. See In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 562-65 (1891) ("The
framers of the Constitution never intended that the legislative power of the
nation should find itself incapable of disposing of a subject matter specifically
committed to its charge."); see also CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 9, at 863
("Less robust is [the] suggestion that Congress cannot authorize states to
regulate non-local commerce.... By the twentieth century, it became accepted doctrine that Congress could authorize state regulation of interstate
commerce.").
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this distinction in application, treating cases categorically. 75
Such categories included those relating to the importation of
harmful goods,7 6 the exportation of natural resources, 77 and
others.78 This lumping together of like cases served to create
the illusion of separate doctrines; in actuality, this fiction was
not far from the truth, as each category developed its own
unique approach to determining whether state regulation discriminated against or burdened interstate commerce. 79
Over the last several decades, this approach to the dormant Commerce Clause has largely collapsed.8 0 In its place, a
new, more uniform jurisprudence has taken shape, resulting in
a two-tiered analytical framework.8 1 This framework has been
described as reflecting a "pervasive dichotomy between state
regulations that discriminate against interstate commerce and
82
those that do not."
The first tier consists of cases in which the statute directly
discriminates against interstate commerce,8 3 a category de75. See Smith, supra note 7, at 1203.
76. See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
77. See, e.g., Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 353
(1908); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 521 (1896), overruled by Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
78. Smith, supra note 7, at 1203 (explaining that "there were special doctrines relating to the importation of harmful goods, the exportation of natural
resources"); see also CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 9, at 867-68 (discussing
the categories of laws typically invalidated under the dormant Commerce
Clause).
79. See Smith, supra note 7, at 1203.
80. See id.; see also Hughes, 441 U.S. at 335 (recognizing a unitary
framework for dormant Commerce Clause analysis); City of Philadelphia,437
U.S. at 624 (describing the evolution of dormant Commerce Clause analysis).
81. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkston, 511 U.S. 383, 402
(1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (restating the analytical framework); Waste
Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 333 (4th Cir. 2001) (same).
82. Smith, supra note 7, at 1204. But see C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 402
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that "there is no clear line separating these
categories").
83. C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 402 (O'Connor, J., concurring). A statute
discriminates against interstate commerce if it benefits in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v.
Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 192 (1994). Intentional discrimination can be either facial-obvious from the face of the statute-or purposive-obvious from the
purpose or intent of the statute. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454-55
(1992). Facially discriminatory measures are ones with which the dormant
Commerce Clause was clearly intended to deal; measures which are not facially discriminatory, by their very nature, are less likely to spur the interstate protectionism and trade wars that the Framers feared and sought to
avert through the Commerce Clause (since their protectionist motivation is
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scribed as being "virtually per se" invalid.84 A statute is per se
invalid if it discriminates against interstate commerce on its
face, in its purpose, or in its effect.8 5 Due to the presumption of
invalidity, statutes within this category are subjected to strict
judicial scrutiny. 86 If the state can present a legitimate public
purpose that cannot be accomplished through nondiscriminatory means, the statute may still be saved from being found unconstitutional.8 7 It is rare, however, for a discriminatory measure to survive strict scrutiny.8 8
If, on the other hand, a statutory provision does not discriminate and only imposes a slight, indirect burden on interstate commerce, it falls into the second tier of cases. This category of cases is subjected to the less rigorous balancing test
adopted under the Supreme Court's decision in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc.89 Under the Pike balancing test, a court examines
the state's interest in the regulation and determines whether
the burden the regulation places on interstate commerce
clearly exceeds the benefits derived from the interest.9 0 Only
not as obvious). Cf. H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949)
(arguing that overt state protectionism led to the adoption of the Commerce
Clause). Although admittedly there is some blurring between these two types,
this Note is concerned only with the latter form of discrimination against interstate commerce.
84. Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 333.
85. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. at 454-55.
86. See id. at 454.
87. See C &A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 402 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also
Shoemake, supra note 72, at 912.
88. Shoemake, supra note 72, at 912; see also O'Grady, supra note 52, at
574 ("As the standard's name suggests, a discriminatory regulation will almost
never survive review under the virtual per se invalid standard of scrutiny.").
In fact, only one law has been upheld upon such review. Lisa Heinzerling, The
Commercial Constitution, 1995 SuP. CT. REv. 217, 217 (citing Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986)).
89. 397 U.S. 137, 146 (1970) (holding that the cost of requiring an in-state
packing plant for locally harvested cantaloupes was excessive in relation to
the requirement's legitimate benefits).
90. See id. at 142 ("Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.") (citing
Huron Cement Co, v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)); see also Shoemake, supra note 72, at 912. As the Pike balancing test shows, a finding of
discriminatory purpose is important even when the challenged provision burdens interstate economic interests. Without a discriminatory purpose, a statute producing such a burden would fall into the category of cases in which the
Pike balancing test is applied. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,
449 U.S. 456, 471-73 (1981) (finding in the absence of a discriminatory pur-
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where the burden on commerce clearly exceeds the benefits is
the regulation found to violate the dormant Commerce Clause.91
C. THE CONFUSION SURROUNDING DISCRIMINATORY PURPOSE
While an analytical framework has emerged from the
miasma surrounding the dormant Commerce Clause, the same
cannot be said for analysis under the second, or discriminatory
purpose, prong of the discrimination inquiry. In part, this may
be the result of the perceived similarities between the process
of uncovering a discriminatory purpose and the process by
92
which a statute is determined to be facially discriminatory.
There is some degree of truth to this perception. In practice,
there is little to distinguish between cases deemed "facially discriminatory" and those deemed "purposefully discriminatory"both are properly concerned with whether the state acted with
improper motive. 93 Accordingly, courts do not alter their "faa facially discriminatory" analysis much, if at all, in analyzing
94
cially neutral statute for discriminatory purpose.
Treating facially neutral statutes analogously to facially
discriminatory statutes when discriminatory purpose is at issue has led some courts to take an ad hoc approach that focuses
on finding evidence of impermissible motive within the challenged statute's legislative history. Such an approach is evident in the Eighth Circuit's discriminatory purpose analysis in
pose that the burdens placed on out-of-state interests were not clearly excessive under the test in Pike). In short, while the finding of a burden on interstate commerce, by itself, might result in the more deferential balancing test
being applied, the finding of discriminatory purpose ensures that strict scrutiny will be applied and the statute almost certainly invalidated. See O'Grady,
supra note 52, at 574 ("A regulation analyzed under the Pike balancing test,
on the other hand, has a far better chance of being declared valid.").
Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
91.
92. See E. Ky. Res. v. Fiscal Ct. of Magoffin County, 127 F.3d 532, 542
(6th Cir. 1997) (finding no real difference between facially and purposefully
discriminatory inquiries aside from the sources of evidence); Alliance for Clean
Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591, 593-96 (7th Cir. 1995) (using facial statutory text
to find evidence of discriminatory purpose); see also O'Grady, supra note 52, at
594 (considering facial and purposeful discrimination as part of the same inquiry into protectionist motive, relying on different evidence).
93. See supra note 83. The only real difference is the type (and reliability)
of evidence of such motive available in a given case. See O'Grady, supra note
52, at 594, 597-98 (stating that statutory text is "typically the 'most reliable
indicator' of impermissible motive").
94. Compare SDDS, Inc. v. South Dakota, 47 F.3d 263, 268-69 (8th Cir.
1995) (providing a discriminatory purpose analysis), with Miller, 44 F.3d at
595-96 (providing a facially discriminatory analysis).
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SDDS, Inc. v. South Dakota.9 5 SDDS involved a challenge not
to a legislative enactment but to a statute passed by referendum. 96 The statute required the legislature to grant permission for large landfills only upon an additional finding that the
97
facility was environmentally safe and in the public interest.
The plaintiff, who sought to construct a large solid waste disposal facility, challenged the enacted referendum as discrimi98
nating in purpose against interstate commerce.
In evaluating the plaintiffs claim, the court focused on an
election information pamphlet and the existing administrative
permit procedure for such facilities, eschewing a standardized
inquiry into the voters' motives.9 9 Statements excerpted from
the state-issued campaign literature that "exhorted voters to
vote against the 'out-of-state dump' because 'South Dakota is
not the nation's dumping grounds' [were found to be] ample
evidence of a discriminatory purpose to trigger strict scrutiny."1°° Discounting the state's argument that additional approval by the legislature was necessary for larger waste disposal facilities, which as the court recognized, generally pose
greater environmental risks, the court found that dual approval
was a relatively ineffective means of achieving such environmental protection.101 Nevertheless, the court gave serious consideration to the state's purported rationale for the referendum
2
only after deciding that strict scrutiny review was required.10
Accordingly, the court struck down the statute as a discriminatory restraint on interstate commerce. 103
95. 47 F.3d at 268-70.
96. Id. at 266 (citing to the challenged statutory provision, S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 34A-6-53 to 56 (Michie 1992)).
97. Id. at 265-66. Previously, solid waste disposal facilities needed only to
gain approval through South Dakota's administrative permit procedure. Id. at
265. At the time, the procedure was to issue a one-year initial permit if the
facility was found to be environmentally safe and in the public interest. Id.
After the initial permit expired, the Department of Water and Natural Resources would review the safety of the facility and, on the basis of that determination, decide whether to issue a five-year renewal of the permit. Id.
98.

See id. at 264-65.

99. See id. at 268-69.
100. Id. at 268. The Attorney General for South Dakota drafted the pamphlet at issue. See id. at 266. The court also relied on the trial court judge's
finding that the initiative "was purposely drafted to insure that, except for
[Plaintiff], the Initiated Measure would not apply to existing or foreseeable
future landfills that dispose of South Dakota waste." Id. at 268.
101. See id. at 269.
102. See id. at 271.

103. Id. at 272. The court also found that the statute had a discriminatory

2002]

AWAKENING A SLEEPING DOG

1079

Another example of such ad hoc analysis is found in the
Sixth Circuit's decision in EasternKentucky Resources v. Fiscal
Court of Magoffin County.1°4 EasternKentucky involved a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to Kentucky's waste management program.105 The legislatively enacted statute was designed to "reduce the amount [sic] of solid waste disposal
facilities in the Commonwealth, and to encourage a regional
approach to solid waste management." 10 6 At the heart of its
provisions, the statute ceded the state's authority over developing waste management strategies to local planning areas, requiring all landfill developments to be in accordance with locally developed waste disposal plans.107
Having had its plans for a new landfill to accept both local
as well as out-of-state waste rejected by Magoffin County, the
plaintiff sought to invalidate the local-control statute as a discriminatory restraint upon interstate commerce.1 0 8 While the
court had little trouble finding the statute to be neutral on its
face with respect to interstate commerce, it struggled to articulate a means of ascertaining whether the statute had been enacted with a discriminatory purpose. As the court recognized,
"'Where discrimination is not patent on the face of a statute,
the party challenging its constitutionality has a more difficult
task."' 10 9 In deciding whether the plaintiff made such a showing, the court first considered the strength of the circumstantial
evidence, examining the statute's stated purpose, legislative
history, and the effectiveness of the statute in carrying out its

effect upon interstate commerce. Id. at 271.
104. 127 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 1997).
105. Id. at 534-38 (citing to the challenged statutory provisions, KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 224.40-315, 224.43-345 (Michie 1995)).
106. See id. at 535. This legislation was the product of an "extraordinary
session" convened by then-Governor Wallace Wilkinson to consider the Commonwealth's waste disposal practices. Id. at 534. At the time the session was
held in 1991, the Commonwealth was under a declared state of environmental
emergency resulting from the "deplorable effects... of its then-current waste
disposal program." Id. at 534-35.
107. Id. at 535.
108. Id. at 539. The plaintiff, offering numerous inducements to secure the
county's cooperation, was initially successful in negotiating a contract with the
county for construction of the landfill. See id. at 538. This approval was later
retracted when the county identified "irregularities in the plan's preparation
and submission." Id. at 538-39.
109. Id. at 542 (quoting C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511
U.S. 383, 423 n.12 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting)).
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purported non-discriminatory purpose. 110 Notably, the court
did not directly examine the state's purported rationale for the
statute."' Since, however, the court found the evidence presented by plaintiff unconvincing, the court held that the plaintiff failed to carry its burden with respect to proving a discriminatory legislative purpose.112
Even where the courts have adopted explicit standards to
guide their inquiry into the state's motives in cases of facially
neutral decisionmaking, they have failed to countenance the
possibility of legitimate non-discriminatory intentions with respect to the challenged policy or decision. 113 The superficiality
of such incomplete inquiries is highlighted by the courts' recognition of the "mixed motive" problem in other areas of constitutional law. 114 Judicial silence on this matter within the context
of the dormant Commerce Clause is certainly not the result of
attorneys failing to raise the issue before the courts; in fact, defense attorneys routinely argue that allegedly discriminatory
statutes were enacted out of purer motives than discriminatory
animus. 115 Nor is it the fault of academicians-scholars have
long made note of the presence of conflicting motivations in the
passage of many regulations that affect interstate commerce.1 1 6
110. See id. In conducting this inquiry, the court found the factors discussed in SDDS, Inc. v. South Dakota to be particularly apt. See id. (citing
SDDS, Inc. v. South Dakota, 47 F.3d 263, 268-69 (8th Cir. 1995)).
111. See id.
112. See id. at 543. Interestingly, the court came close to recognizing that
more than a showing of circumstantial evidence indicating discriminatory
purpose is required for the plaintiff to meet its burden. See id. In dicta, it
commented that even if the circumstantial evidence had been sufficient to
raise an inference of discriminatory purpose, there was no "evidence to show
that the [inflammatory rhetoric] impacted the legislature... or how the
[rhetoric] led to the passage of... the challenged provisions." Id. In essence,
the court hinted that the plaintiff, in proving its case, must show a causal link.
113. See, e.g., McNeilus Truck & Mfg., Inc. v. Ohio I. Montgomery, 226 F.3d
429, 444 (6th Cir. 2000) (dismissing the possibility of a legitimate motive for
the challenged statute).
114. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274 (1977) (addressing the "mixed motive" problem in the context of a First
Amendment retaliation claim).
115. See Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 340 (4th
Cir. 2001) (indicating that the state argued the statute was enacted for "neutral reasons"); SDDS, 47 F.3d at 271 (stating that the state argued that its
motive was environmental protection).
116. See O'Grady, supra note 52, at 599 ("In enacting a piece of legislation
[burdening interstate commerce], a legislature may be responding to a number
of underlying motivations or incentives. A legislature, for example, may be
motivated, solely or in part, by legitimate safety or environmental concerns.")
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Nonetheless, even when pursuing a more formal inquiry into
intent the courts have never explicitly considered the possibility of "mixed motives" being present in the legislative 11process
7
and have rarely given much weight to such contentions.
In
Two cases are illustrative of this phenomenon.
McNeilus Truck and Manufacturing,Inc. v. Ohio ex rel. Montgomery, the plaintiff, an out-of-state vehicle re-manufacturer
that did business in Ohio, challenged an Ohio statute requiring
re-manufacturers to be located within twenty miles of their
customers or have a binding service agreement with a dealer
within the vicinity as a condition of licensing.11 8 Alleging a
host of constitutional claims, the plaintiff claimed that the
statute discriminated against interstate commerce, specifically
out-of-state vehicle re-manufacturers.

119

While the Sixth Circuit found the statute neutral on its
face, it decided that the statute was both discriminatory in its
effect and in its purpose and struck it down.12 0 Although resting its decision primarily on the finding of discriminatory effect, the court also found the statute to have a discriminatory
purpose according to the standard set out in Pete's Brewing Co.
v. Whitehead.12 1 Accordingly, the court found "several letters
(footnotes omitted); see also Patrick C. McGinley, Trashing the Constitution:
JudicialActivism, The Dormant Commerce Clause, and the Federalism Mantra, 71 OR. L. REV. 409, 440 (1992) ("Invalidation of these state measures has
occurred even though, in most of these jurisdictions, the legislative motive is
not economic protectionism. The primary motive is to protect quality of life
and the environment. Any impact on interstate commerce is, in most cases,
truly incidental.")
117. See McNeilus, 226 F.3d at 444 (failing to recognize the possibility of
"mixed motives"). But see E. Ky. Res. v. Fiscal Ct. of Magoffin County, 127
F.3d 532, 543 (6th Cir. 1997) (suggesting in dicta that the court should inquire
into whether the discriminatory purpose actually affected passage of the statute); Randy's Sanitation, Inc. v. Wright County, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1029 (D.
Minn. 1999) ("In order to prevail, Randy's must prove that the County's decisionmakers were motivated by a desire to stifle interstate commerce, and that
the same decision would not have been made absent this wrongful motivation.").
118. 226 F.3d 429, 434-37 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing to the challenged statutory
provisions, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4517.02(e), 4517.12(A), 4517.12(C)
(Anderson 1999)). Prior to filing suit, the plaintiff had attempted to enter into
a servicing agreement with Ohio dealerships without success. See id. at 436.
In fact, one dealer returned McNeilus's letter with the simple response, "Go to
Hell." Id.
119. See id. at 437.
120. See id. at 443.
121. See id. (citing 19 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (W.D. Mo. 1998) (striking down a
labeling law that was lobbied for by local producers instead of consumers)).
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by in-state dealers" to legislators and the dealers' admission
that consumers had not complained about servicing arrangements with out-of-state dealers to be sufficient evidence of discriminatory purpose. 22 Such a finding was made in spite of the
court's recognition that "[t]here are no doubt some legitimate
state interests served by this statute" and that consumer protection was a possible motive in its passage. 123
Finally, in Waste Management Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore,
the plaintiffs, several landfill operators and transporters of
municipal solid waste, successfully challenged Virginia statutory provisions regulating the transportation and disposal of
municipal solid waste as violating the dormant Commerce
Clause. 124 The provisions capped the amount of municipal solid
waste that landfills could accept and restricted the use of
barges and trucks to transport such waste. 125 Apparently inspired by the closure of Fresh Kills landfill in New York and
the plaintiffs' plans to significantly increase their importation
of New York waste into Virginia, the statute was enacted in
April 1999.126 Facing the statute's chilling effect on their plans,
the plaintiffs filed suit, alleging a violation of the dormant
Commerce Clause. 127
In its analysis, the Fourth Circuit denied summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the discriminatory effects of the stat128
ute, finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 444.
124. See 252 F.3d 316, 323-24 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing to the challenged
statutory provisions, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1408.1(Q), 10.1-1408.3, 10.11454.1(A), 10.1-1454.2, 10.1-1454.3 (Michie Supp. 2000)).
125. See id at 323. The first provision capped the amount of waste that
any Virginia landfill could accept. Id. The second provision prohibited the
stacking of waste containers more than two containers high on any ship,
barge, or other vessel. Id. The third provision prohibited the commercial
transport of solid waste on Virginia's navigable waterways. Id. The fourth
provision prohibited landfill operators from accepting waste from a vehicle
with four or more axles without certification that the waste is free of certain
substances. Id. at 323-24. The fifth provision required that owners of such
vehicles make certain financial assurances. Id. at 324.
126. See id. at 323, 327. In July 1998, having learned of Fresh Kills landfill's impending closure, Virginia State Senator Bill Boling, the statute's sponsor, wrote to Virginia Attorney General Mark Earley: "I am concerned that the
pressure for additional importation will increase even more in the next few
years. If it is legally possible to do so, I would like to introduce legislation...
that would place restrictions on such importations." Id. at 326-27.
127. Id. at 324.
128. Id. at 335.
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However, the court did find that the statute was passed with a
discriminatory purpose. 129 Applying the four part standard for
finding discriminatory intent from Sylvia Development Corp. v.
Calvert County, 130 the court rested its finding on the historical
background and the sequence of events leading up to the statute's enactment. 13 1 The court focused specifically on statements evincing discriminatory intent made by the statute's
sponsor as well as the governor. 132 Faced with such strong evidence, the court did not even consider the state's proffered justifications for the statute until its strict scrutiny analysis. 133 In
applying that analysis, the court found that the plaintiffs were
entitled to summary judgment in their favor on all but the
barge provision, which raised a genuine issue of material fact
with respect to whether it was the least discriminatory alterna134
tive.
The casualness with which courts determine discriminatory motive is undoubtedly in part the result of cases such as
SDDS and Waste Management, which drip with discriminatory
animus. 135 In such cases, the preferred analysis differs little
from the cursory examination typically applied in facially discriminatory cases. 136 Cases such as these blur the analytical
lines, but more importantly distract courts from considering
other legitimate motives behind the challenged statute in less
clear-cut cases.137 As Eastern Kentucky aptly noted in dicta, it
129. Id. at 336.
130. 48 F.3d 810, 819 (4th Cir. 1995). The four factors that Sylvia held to
be probative of whether a state was motivated by discriminatory intent are as
follows: 1) evidence of a consistent pattern of actions by the decisionmaking
body disparately impacting members of a particular class of persons; 2) historical background of the decision; 3) the specific sequence of events leading up
to the particular decision being challenged; and 4) contemporary statements
made by decisionmakers on the record. Id.
131. Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 336 (4th Cir.
2001).
132. See id. at 337-40. Senator Boiling and Governor Gilmore, throughout
the period leading up to the statute's passage, issued many statements indicating their hostility towards out-of-state waste, including a letter from Gilmore to New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani stating, "Let me assure you
that the home state of Washington, Jefferson, and Madison has no intention of
becoming New York's dumping grounds." Id. at 337.
133. See id. at 340-41.
134.

See id. at 344-45.

135. See supra notes 99-100, 12933and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
137.
See, e.g., McNeilus Truck & Mfg., Inc. v. Ohio ex rel. Montgomery,
226 F.3d 429, 443 (6th Cir. 2000).
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is not enough to note a discriminatory motive behind the legislation-one must also find that that motive led to the passage
of the statute. 138 By assuming that discriminatory intent can
be proven solely by reference to part of the legislative record or
by some other similarly simplistic method of inquiry, the courts
have foregone the necessary second part of the analysis, determining whether an adequate causal link exists between discriminatory intent and actual passage of the legisl.ation. 139
III. THE SLEEPING DOG: THE CURRENT APPROACH AND
ITS FAILINGS
While dormant Commerce Clause cases decided solely on
grounds of discriminatory purpose are "relatively rare,"140 there
is, nonetheless, reason to be concerned with the path taken by
the courts with respect to this subset of cases. To better understand the threat of the courts' current approach to analyzing
discriminatory purpose, consider the following hypothetical: A
state legislature, facing a serious waste disposal crisis within
its borders, considers restrictive legislation aimed at encouraging recycling and other landfill alternatives. During the course
of legislative debate on the bill, several legislators argue in favor of it, citing a desire to decrease the importation of out-ofstate waste, which has increased dramatically in recent years.
Ultimately, the legislation is enacted into law. The law itself is
neutral on its face and regulates in-state and out-of-state waste
evenhandedly.
Assuming a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to the
statute, the court would likely attach significance to statements
made by the legislators as evidence of discriminatory purpose. 14 1 In contrast, if the courts' current jurisprudence is any
guide, little attention would be given to the legitimate purpose
for which the legislation was actually approved. 142 If considered at all, such evidence would be relegated to the perfunctory

138. See E. Ky. Res. v. Fiscal Ct. of Magoffin County, 127 F.3d 532, 542-43
(6th Cir. 1997).
139. One commentator, however, takes issue with the contention that no
constitutional violation exists in the absence of the secondary, causal, showing. See Nahmod, supra note 35, at 605 (arguing that "there is a First
Amendment violation in this situation"). Instead, he argues, the secondary
showing should only impact the damages allowed. See id.
140. Lawrence, supra note 9, at 419.
141. See supra notes 100, 110, 122, 132 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 102, 111, 123, 133 and accompanying text.
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inquiry made into governmental purpose after strict scrutiny
has already been decided upon. 143 Thus, the courts' approach
could easily lead to, and indeed would seem to encourage, judicial invalidation of the statute under the dormant Commerce
Clause. Assuming such a result, the courts' approach then
raises several concerns for both the doctrine as well as for
waste management policymaking.
First, the unprincipled approach taken by the courts raises
common federalism objections to the dormant Commerce
Clause as a whole. In general, the federalism critique has centered around the dubious origins of the doctrine. 14 Such concerns have only been magnified by the courts' expansion of the
doctrine over the last several decades. As Justice Scalia remarked in his concurring opinion in Tyler Pipe Industries v.
Washington State Department of Revenue,
[To the extent that we have gone beyond guarding against rank discrimination against citizens of other states... the Court for over a
century has engaged in an enterprise that it has been unable to justify by textual support or even coherent nontextual theory, that it was
almost certainly not intended to undertake, and that it has not undertaken very well. It is astonishing that we should be expanding our
beachhead in this impoverished territory, rather than being satisfied
with what we
have already acquired by a sort of intellectual adverse
145
possession.

Other justices have echoed such concerns. For instance,
146
Justice Thomas, in Camps Newfound/ Owatonna v. Harrison,
criticized the dormant Commerce Clause as "[having] no basis
in the text of the Constitution, [making] little sense, and [having] proved virtually unworkable in application."147
As a practical matter, this common set of misgivings about
the dormant Commerce Clause has raised concern among many
commentators and jurists about the doctrine's impact on state

143. See supra notes 102, 111, 123, 133 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., McGinley, supra note 116, at 409 ("By recognizing a constitutional principle which is not found in the text of the charter, but is said to flow
from the document's negative inferences, the Court may be seen as significantly altering a federal system delicately balanced by the framers."); Redish
& Nugent, supra note 61, at 573 ([N]ot only is there no textual basis to support recognition of such a concept, but also that the dormant commerce clause
actually contradicts, and therefore directly undermines, the Constitution's
carefully established textual structure for allocating power between federal
and state sovereigns."); see also supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
145. 483 U.S. 232, 265 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
146. 520 U.S. 565 (1997).
147. Id. at 610 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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sovereignty. 148 Compounded by the fact that the dormant
Commerce Clause, according to one commentator, "has proved
to be one of the most prolific sources of invalidation of state
laws,"1 49 the doctrine's uncertain constitutional standing and
frequent use have contributed to a desire to rein in the
Clause.150 In effect, according to this view, doctrinal uncertainty counsels even more strongly in favor of judicial deference
to state legislation. 15 1
Viewed in this context, the courts' discriminatory purpose
jurisprudence is clearly subject to indictment under the principles of federalism. Where, as in the hypothetical, the courts'
approach allows for a discriminatory purpose to be found when
another more legitimate purpose motivated passage of the
statute, the current jurisprudence is a direct affront to state
sovereignty, for it fails to respect legitimate state policymaking.152 Since the case law does nothing to ensure that a legitimate statute will be upheld against a dormant Commerce
Clause challenge, it threatens to inflame federalism sensibilities more moderate than those of Justices Scalia and Thomas. 153 As the courts take greater notice of such arguments in

this more federalism-conscious jurisprudential era, 154 the dormant Commerce Clause, as a whole, will be rendered more vulnerable to the larger criticisms made by those who oppose the
148. See, e.g., Dinan, supra note 8, at 181-85 (noting that a growing number of Supreme Court justices are disturbed by the federalism implications of
dormant Commerce Clause cases); Heinzerling, supra note 88, at 276 (describing application of the Clause as "a Lochner-style incursion on [state] legislative autonomy"); Lawrence, supra note 9, at 398-99 (arguing that current doctrinal uncertainty with respect to the Clause infringes upon basic state
sovereignty); McGinley, supra note 116, at 440 (suggesting that the dormant
Commerce Clause's "impact on federalism ...principles is significant indeed").
149. Dinan, supranote 8, at 181.
150. See id. at 183-85 (stating that Scalia and other federalist jurists believe that the doctrine should be substantially limited or eliminated altogether); see also supra note 144 and accompanying text.
151. See Dinan, supra note 8, at 183; see also supra note 144 and accompanying text.
152. See Dinan, supra note 8, at 183 (commenting that Scalia believes any
additional requirements to be an undue burden on state policymaking).
153. See Lawrence, supra note 9, at 398 (stating that the doctrine's uncertainty as to what violates the dormant Commerce Clause "disturb[s] in a basic
sense [state] sovereignty"); see also supra notes 144, 148 and accompanying
text.
154. See Dinan, supra note 8, at 181 ("The distinctive aspect of the
Rehnquist Court's approach to Dormant Commerce Clause cases is that several justices have begun to call attention to the federalism implications of
these cases ....
").
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doctrine.
Besides diminishing state sovereignty, the courts' current
approach threatens the doctrine's overall legitimacy as an instrument of controlling protectionist impulses. While some
commentators see the dormant Commerce Clause as a mere redundancy, made irrelevant by federal preemption, 155 the Clause
undoubtedly possesses some degree of utility as a check on
economic protectionism. 56 After all, it was the federal courts,
not Congress or the administrative agencies, that prevented
bitter interstate disputes in Waste Management and other similar cases from escalating into greater conflicts. 57 The doctrine's continued efficacy in this regard, however, depends on
its ability to effectuate the Framers' intent. Just like a rule
that has deserted its rationale over the course of many subsequent applications, a doctrine that abandons its purpose is destined to be disregarded-after all, stare
decisis cannot be relied
58
upon to preserve a vestige forever.
If the dormant Commerce Clause is to avoid such a fate, it
must stay reasonably true to its judicially ascribed purpose. As
discussed in Part II, the courts created the doctrine out of their
understanding of the Framers' desire to prevent economic protectionism of the type that doomed the Articles of Confederation. 159 The specter of this protectionism today can generally be
found in two different settings: where a statute either intentionally discriminates against or disparately affects out-of-state
interests. 160 Thus, the dormant Commerce Clause only has le155. See Farber, supra note 10, at 407 ("[Federal administrative agencies
often have jurisdiction over the industries involved in dormant commerce
clause cases. They may pass substantive regulations inconsistent with state
law, thereby preempting state law."); see also Redish & Nugent, supra note 61,
at 594-99 (finding congressional oversight of state enacted protectionist legislation to be preferable to judicial oversight under the dormant Commerce
Clause).
156. See O'Grady, supra note 52, at 576 (contending that the Clause is useful in guarding against economically protectionist measures). But see Farber,
supra note 10, at 411 (arguing that "vigorous judicial review is probably not
needed to keep states from blockading the national economy").
157. See supra notes 124-34 and accompanying text.
158. See Farber, supra note 10, at 411 (noting that stare decisis has been
no hindrance to the Supreme Court in "overrul[ing] outmoded cases" within
the Commerce Clause).
159. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
160. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390
(1994) (stating the dormant Commerce Clause's rationale as being the prohibition of "state or municipal laws whose object is local economic protectionism"
and "laws that impose commercial barriers... against an article of commerce
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gitimate application to statutes that intentionally or effectively
discriminate against interstate commerce.161
According to this view of the Clause's purpose, the courts'
confused approach to determining discriminatory purpose allows for the illegitimate application of the dormant Commerce
Clause. Again, the hypothetical described above provides an
example of a situation in which the courts' approach could
leave the overall doctrine subject to attack. To the extent that
their discriminatory purpose jurisprudence allows for the invalidation of statutes that discriminate neither intentionally
nor in effect, the courts have rendered the doctrine illegitimate
in its application.
Even under a more circumscribed view of the dormant
Commerce Clause's underlying purpose, the courts' approach is
plainly illegitimate. Having rejected the free trade rationale
for the dormant Commerce Clause, 162 several commentators
have suggested that the doctrine's only concern should be with
statutes that intentionally discriminate against out-of-state interests. 163 Such a position shows even less tolerance for judicial
overreaching of the kind in which the courts have engaged with
respect to finding discriminatory purpose. 164 Regardless of how
one conceives of the doctrine and its proper limits, one reaches
the same conclusion-the courts' recklessness threatens the
overall legitimacy of the dormant Commerce Clause.
This betrayal of purpose is needlessly harmful. Taken together with the federalism concerns, the courts' illegitimate
by reason of its origin or destination out of State"); see also O'Grady, supra
note 52, at 576 (arguing that the dormant Commerce Clause is properly only
concerned with economically protectionist measures).
161. What is less certain is whether the invalidation of statutes that burden interstate commerce under the Pike balancing test are legitimate applications of the dormant Commerce Clause. A number of scholars argue that it is
not. See Farber, supra note 10, at 414 ("IT]he Court should only intervene
when an intent to discriminate against interstate commerce can be proved.");
see also O'Grady, supra note 52, at 576.
162. This rationale has been conceived of as an anti-trade barrier value
imbedded within the Constitution. See Farber, supra note 10, at 401. Farber
argues that such a value does not provide a convincing rationale for the dormant Commerce Clause because Congress is always free to authorize legislation that imposes such barriers and that, supposing such a value exists, it
would provide a basis for congressional, but not judicial action. See id. at 402.
163. See id. at 414; O'Grady, supra note 52, at 576; see also supra notes
160-61.
164. Because this position is only concerned with protectionist regulations,
it stands to reason that its proponents would be unwilling to countenance the
invalidation of statutes not enacted out of such intent.
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application of the clause provides those who would dismantle it
with powerful arguments that some day could prove convincing
enough to curtail or seriously cripple the doctrine's utility.
Beyond the problems created for the overall doctrine, the
courts' failure to ensure that a causal link exists between discriminatory purpose and enactment threatens a more serious
consequence-bad policymaking. Specifically, it threatens to
unnecessarily restrict the states' police power to regulate matters affecting the public health, safety, and welfare. 165 By allowing courts to overreach in finding a discriminatory purpose,
the current jurisprudence encourages invalidation of otherwise
valid state environmental and land use statutes. 6 6 The hypothetical provides an example of such a situation: A dormant
Commerce Clause challenge to the hypothetical statute would
invalidate legislative efforts to fashion a responsive solution to
the state's waste crisis. As Chief Justice Rehnquist has noted,
the current approach to the dormant Commerce Clause "cranks
the dormant Commerce Clause ratchet against the States...
and by doing so ties the hands of the States in addressing the
167
vexing national problem of... waste disposal."
Not only does the uncertainty surrounding the courts'
standard for finding discriminatory purpose allow for case-bycase invalidation of legitimately enacted local environmental
policies, but it also chills legislation in such areas. 168 In the
165. See Davies, supra note 62, at 278-79 ("When Congress is relying on
state sovereignty, and the Supreme Court is eroding that autonomy, a double
whammy ... ensues: less state autonomy and less environmental protection
overall."); Lawrence, supra note 9, at 398 ("Under the current doctrine, lawmakers and others at the state level are left with far too little idea of which
state laws will... withstand judicial scrutiny. This... hinders States' efforts
to regulate matters within their own borders .

. . .");

see also Earl M. Maltz,

The Impact of the ConstitutionalRevolution of 1937 on the Dormant Commerce
Clause-A Case Study in the Decline of State Autonomy, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 121, 145 (1995) ("Dormant Commerce Clause analyses should give substantial weight to the value of state autonomy. Unfortunately, the Court often
has failed to recognize the importance of this consideration. As a result, national uniformity has become almost a fetish and the virtues of local control
often have been undervalued.").
166. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
167. Or. Waste Sys. v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 109 (1994)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also Dinan, supra note 8, at 183-85 (noting
the Supreme Court's recent federalism critique of the dormant Commerce
Clause).
168. See Lawrence, supra note 9, at 398-99; see also Farber, supra note 10
at 414 ("Because the outcomes of the cases are so unpredictable, the doctrine
may well have a chilling effect on legitimate state regulation.").
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words of one commentator, "A state that is uncertain about the
limits of its authority in regulating activity that might affect
interstate commerce may be hesitant to enact novel and possibly visionary laws out of fear that they will be struck down in
court."169 As always, fear of litigation in an unsettled area of
the law is a powerful deterrent to legislative experimenta170
tion.
Thus, the courts' approach to ascertaining whether a statute discriminates in purpose against interstate commerce poses
a number of threats. It threatens immediate state efforts to
regulate the local environment and land use, while rendering
the dormant Commerce Clause as a whole more vulnerable to
future criticism. When closely examined, the courts' approach
is exposed as a method devoid of any internal consistency,
sense, or policy concern.
IV. AWAKENING THE DOG: APPLYING THE MT.
HEALTHY STANDARD TO THE DORMANT COMMERCE
CLAUSE
Mt. Healthy takes a markedly different approach to determining discriminatory purpose. 17 1 Instead of focusing solely on
the presence of an invidious purpose, the Court held that purpose must be the causal factor for the action complained of by
72
the plaintiff.
While the Mt. Healthy standard suggests a possible alternative to the current confusion, it is necessary to ask whether
such a doctrine would be feasible within the context of the dormant Commerce Clause, and if so, whether it successfully addresses the criticism of the current approach discussed in Part
III. In meeting these concerns, the Mt. Healthy standard does
in fact provide a superior alternative to the current approach to
ascertaining whether a statute discriminates in its purpose
against interstate commerce.
A. APPLICATION OF THE MT. HEALTHY STANDARD TO THE
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE

As a practical matter, there appear to be no significant im169.
170.
171.
286-87
172.

See Lawrence, supra note 9, at 398-99.
See id.
See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,
(1977).
See id.
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pediments to the application of the Mt. Healthy standard to the
dormant Commerce Clause. First, there is no principled distinction between the different constitutional settings arguing
against the further extension of the approach. 3 In Mt.
Healthy, the Court emphasized that the secondary causal inquiry into discriminatory intent was necessary so as not to
command "undesirable consequences not necessary to the assurance of [constitutional] rights."1 74 This rationale is equally
applicable within the context of the dormant Commerce Clause.
In that setting, the requirement of a causal inquiry would ensure that no statute was invalidated which was not in fact motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Since invalidations of
non-discriminatory statutes are undesirable and serve no purpose with respect to the dormant Commerce Clause, the same
rationale justifies the extension of the Mt. Healthy standard.
Even if no principled distinction exists between the dormant Commerce Clause and other settings in which the Mt.
Healthy standard has been applied, detractors still might argue
that the standard would be difficult to implement within the
context of the dormant Commerce Clause because of the inscrutability of legislative intent. 175 This argument, however, does
not go far enough. First, the difficulty of ascertaining motive is
not unique to the dormant Commerce Clause; the same critiques have been made of Equal Protection Clause cases and
others employing the Mt. Healthy standard. 176 Yet, as one
commentator notes, the "problems of proof... have not proved
insurmountable" in those settings.17 7 Second, with the possible
exception of public referenda,' 78 legislative intent is easier to
173. See Farber, supra note 10, at 403 ("mhe dormant commerce clause
serves a function much like that of the equal protection clause."). But see
Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 876 n.6 (1985) ("The Commerce
Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is integrally concerned with
whether a state purpose implicates local or national interests."). This distinction, however, does not counsel against application of Mt. Healthy. In both
contexts, the trier must still find that a discriminatory purpose motivated the
state action.
174. 429 U.S. at 287.
175. See Farber, supra note 10, at 405 (stating a common objection that
[flew states [would] be foolish enough to adopt facially discriminatory
stautes.").
176. See id. at 404-05.

177. Id. at 405.
178. As SDDS, Inc. v. South Dakota indicates, there is usually only a
sparse record from which to infer the intent of the electorate in approving referenda. 47 F.3d 263, 266 (8th Cir. 1995) (focusing on state-issued campaign
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ascertain than the intent of non-institutional actors. This is for
the simple reason that legislative actors at least leave a record
to assist the judicial fact-finder in determining motive. 17 9 Finally, if doubts persist, the Mt. Healthy approach places the
burden of disproving a discriminatory motivation on the defendant. 180 Such an approach gives the plaintiff the benefit of any
doubt concerning legislative motivation and eliminates any serious concern about the practical application of the Mt. Healthy
standard to the dormant Commerce Clause.
B. ADDRESSING THE DEFICIENCIES OF THE CURRENT APPROACH:
THE SUPERIORITY OF THE MT. HEALTHY STANDARD

Having addressed the practical concerns about applying
the Mt. Healthy standard to the dormant Commerce Clause, it
is necessary to examine whether this alternative is any more
successful in addressing the criticism leveled against the
courts' current approach.
The hypothetical described in Part III illustrates the advantages of the Mt. Healthy approach in comparison to the current tack taken by the courts. Under both approaches, the initial step of analysis under the dormant Commerce Clause
would be very similar, if not the same: The plaintiff would
carry the initial burden of proving that the intent to discriminate against out-of-state waste was a "substantial" or "motivating" factor in the legislature's passage of the statute. 181 In
meeting this burden, the plaintiff, like the plaintiff in Waste
Management, could provide evidence of the statements made
evincing such intent and the sequence of events leading up to

literature as evidence of voter's discriminatory purpose in passing referendum).
179. That being said, the traditional caveat concerning the difficulties of
ascertaining collective intent from often individualized accounts of legislative
history should be noted. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 932 n.28, 933 (1994)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that legislative history consists of"a series of
partisan statements about purposes and objectives collected by congressional
staffers and packaged into a committee report" and should only be consulted
as an interpretive device "when the text of a statute is 'inescapably ambiguous'" (quoting Schwegman Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395
(1951) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
180. 429 U.S. at 287.
181. Compare id. (requiring the plaintiff to show discriminatory intent was
a 'substantial" or "motivating" factor), with Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v.
Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 336 (4th Cir. 2001) (requiring the plaintiff to show that
the decisionmaking body was motivated by discriminatory intent).
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its introduction.18 2
Assuming the sufficiency of such a showing, the two approaches would then diverge. Under the current approach, no
further inquiry would be required; discriminatory purpose
would be proven conclusively, and the court would proceed under the presumption of per se invalidity. 183 If the Mt. Healthy
approach were applied, however, the burden would then shift to
the defendant state to prove that it would have enacted the
statute regardless of an economic protectionist motive.18 4 Here,
the state could present evidence of its waste disposal crisis, its
strong and legitimate desire to encourage recycling, and its
evenhanded regulation of in-state and out-of-state interests.
Assuming, again, the sufficiency of such a showing, the Mt.
Healthy approach would uphold the statute as a legitimate exercise of state regulatory power.
The additional step taken by the Mt. Healthy approach allows it to address the doctrinal and policymaking concerns
raised by the courts' current approach. First, it immunizes the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to a certain extent from its
harshest criticism. While it would not eliminate the nontextual basis for the doctrine, it would diminish the federalism
argument that the doctrine undervalues state sovereignty. No
such argument is possible where the state is allowed to affirmatively prove that its policy was in fact motivated by legitimate policy concerns. Compared to the current approach,
which does not examine such evidence until the statute's invalidity has been already presumed, 185 the Mt. Healthy approach
accords legitimate state policymaking the respect it deserves.
Second, as illustrated by the hypothetical, the Mt. Healthy
standard also possesses an advantage over the current standardless approach because it addresses the concurrent issue of
legitimacy. While the current approach only evaluates the substantiality of a discriminatory purpose, the alternative takes
the second step of ensuring that that purpose was in fact what
motivated the statute's passage. By doing so, the application of
Mt. Healthy invalidates only those statutes that are truly discriminatory in purpose. Thus, unlike the courts' current approach, it uses the doctrine in a manner true to its legitimate
182. See 252 F.3d at 336.
183. See id. at 341 (concluding that the decisionmaking body was motivated by discriminatory purpose and applying strict scrutiny analysis).
184. See 429 U.S. at 287.
185. See supra notes 102, 111, 123, 133 and accompanying text.
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purpose of proscribing discrimination against interstate commerce
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, extension of the
Mt. Healthy standard to the dormant Commerce Clause answers the practical policymaking concerns raised by the current
approach. As the hypothetical demonstrates, the less rigorous
current approach, by undervaluing legitimate local policymaking, is more likely to transfer actual regulatory power from the
states to the federal courts. This is less likely to be the case
with the Mt. Healthy approach, as it is more deferential to local
prerogatives.
Additionally, through its standardized application, the Mt.
Healthy standard is less likely to discourage state regulation in
areas touching upon interstate commerce. Decreasing the constitutional uncertainty surrounding policymaking in areas of
waste management and land use will allow for the creative legislation those areas desperately demand. 186 Thus, the Mt.
Healthy standard satisfactorily addresses concerns with the
current approach and presents itself as a legitimate alternative.
CONCLUSION: "DON'T LET A SLEEPING DOG LIE"
The courts have taken a woefully dysfunctional approach
to the discriminatory purpose prong of the current dormant
Commerce Clause analysis. The most recent cases demonstrate
a scattershot approach to determining the presence of a discriminatory purpose, one made particularly dangerous by the
courts' lack of concern for whether such purpose actually motivated the challenged state action.
Moreover, this is not harmless error. The courts' failure to
recognize the distinction between discriminatory and nondiscriminatory motives raises the possibility of judicial invalidation of legitimate state legislation. Furthermore, the courts'
lack of concern for such a possibility renders it subject to attacks on federalist and legitimacy grounds, while threatening
to chill state environmental and waste management policymaking. These are telltale signs of a doctrine in need of change.
While the court's current approach poses serious problems
for the doctrine as well as the states burdened by the courts'
186. See Redish & Nugent, supra note 61, at 598 (arguing that state legislative experimentation would increase if judicial invalidation of such legislation decreased).
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potential overreaching, these concerns would be satisfactorily
addressed if courts were to adopt the approach embraced in
other constitutional settings, as typified by the Mt. Healthy and
Lesage cases. By also inquiring into whether the discriminatory purpose was the "but for" cause of the statute's passage,
the Mt. Healthy approach would cure the complained-of defects
in the courts' current approach. It would minimize criticism of
the doctrine's overall legitimacy by restricting invalidation to
those situations in which a statute can truly be said to have
had a discriminatory purpose, according legitimate state legislation the respect it deserves. Without this necessary second
part of the analysis, the courts have done worse than Holmes's
dog: They have rendered themselves incapable of detecting
whether interstate commerce was "kicked," or merely "stumbled over."

1096

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.86:1063

